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NOTES
FIRING EMPLOYEES FOR REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO
URINALYSIS: THE CASE FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD OF
REASONABLE INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
I. INTRODUCTION
Submitting to an employer's demand for a urinalysis test to detect in-
gestion of drugs means laying your privacy, reputation, career, livelihood
and possibly your freedom1 on the line. The chances of being asked to
submit to a urinalysis2 or a polygraph test 3 pursuant to employment are
well within the realm of possibility. Virginia Electrical Power Company
("Virginia Power"), the fifth largest employer in Virginia,4 utilizes both
urinalysis and polygraphs as investigative tools.' Thus, it is foreseeable
1. Brief for Appellee at 39, McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa), af'd, 746
F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985). NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., PuS. No. 86-1442, EMPLOYER DRUG SCREENING 9 (1986) [hereinafter EMPLOYER DRUG
SCREENING].
Edison Electric Institute company policy expressly states: "Law enforcement officials will
be notified whenever illegal drugs are found." BNA SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN
THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, CONTROLS, AND CoNTRoVERsIEs 22 (1986) [hereinafter SPECIAL
REPORT].
2. One-fourth of Fortune 500 companies use compulsory and random urine testing to
detect traces of illegal drugs in their employees. Such companies include General Motors,
Greyhound, E.F. Hutton, IBM, Mobil, the New York Times, as well as the Teamsters and
United Auto Workers unions. Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to
the Bill of Rights, 88 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 921 (1987). Almost 30% of Fortune 500 companies
use pre-employment drug screening. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
3. The American Polygraph Association at its 1985 annual meeting estimated that 2.3
million people had undergone polygraph examinations. Biographs in the Workplace: The
Use of "Lie Detectors" in Hiring and Firing: Hearings on H.R. 1524 and 1924 Before the
Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings].
4. Virginia Power employs approximately 13,101 employees based in Richmond. Rich-
mond News Leader, July 18, 1988, at B-4, col. 1.
5. Every employment applicant to Virginia Power must submit a urinalysis report,
whether the position applied for is legal counsel, high voltage linesman or nuclear plant
inspector. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") does not require drug testing of
Virginia Power's nuclear plant employees, relying instead on the nuclear industry to police
its own operations. If the NRC, a public agency, were to mandate drug testing the question
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that a situation may develop where an employee is fired for refusing to
submit to a urinalysis test. This Note focuses on issues that arise when an
employee, whether in the public or private sector, is discharged for refus-
ing to submit to a urinalysis. In particular, this Note will analyze the con-
stitutional issues raised by mandatory drug testing, especially as this
practice affects public sector employees, and possible causes of action
available to private sector employees who have been discharged for fail-
ure to submit to mandatory testing.
II. THE URINALYSIS - POLYGRAPH COMPARISON
Virginia courts have not yet considered a suit by an employee challeng-
ing his termination for refusing to submit to a urinalysis.' The Virginia
General Assembly has also remained silent on the issue of drug testing in
the workplace.7 However, the use of polygraph examinations in the work-
place raises issues similar to those regarding urinalysis, particularly the
issue of admissibility. Virginia does regulate the qualification and licens-
ing of polygraph examiners.8 While there are no Virginia cases dealing
with an employee's refusal to submit to a polygraph, such cases have been
decided in other jurisdictions.9 Virginia courts have ruled on the admissi-
arises whether the action comes under the color of state action, thereby triggering the con-
stitutional protections currently available to public employees. See infra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text.
Virginia Power company policy prohibits the use, possession, or dealing of illegal drugs on
company property or during company business hours. Telephone interview with Scott
Robinson, Virginia Power legal services, in Richmond, Va. (Aug. 27, 1987).
Violation of this policy will result in termination. Illegal off-duty involvement with drugs
is also considered a violation of company policy subject to termination, if the involvement
adversely affects the company or its employees. Virginia Power employees are not to be
under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal, which impairs their ability to perform
their duties. VIRGINIA POWER, ALCOHOL & DRUG ABusE (Revised July 15, 1986) (employees'
Health and Safety Information pamphlet).
6. The Virginia Court of Appeals recently considered a case involving employment drug
testing. The decision, however, was restricted to whether a positive drug test result consti-
tuted disqualification for unemployment benefits pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 60.1-58(b)
(1950) (repealed 1987). Blake v. Hercules, Inc., 4 Va. App. 270, 356 S.E.2d 453 (1987).
7. The only reference to urine tests in the Virginia Code is found in Virginia Rule 3A:11,
which, provides the accused in the prosecution of a felony in a circuit court the right to
discover written reports of urine tests that are within the possession of the Commonwealth.
Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:11(b)(1)(ii).
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-916 to -922 (Repl. Vol. 1982). Virginia is among 26 states that
impose licensing requirements on polygraph examiners. Hearings, supra note 3, at 52 (state-
ment of Robert F. Harbrent, Pres. of Food & Allied Service Trade Dept., AFL-CIO).
Designed as a protection against abuse, these statutes appear to have a legitimizing effect,
i.e., indicating to the public that the polygraph is a legally and scientifically acceptable
method of detecting deception. The states that license polygraph examiners have a greater
number of companies using polygraphs. Id.
9. E.g., Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979) (refusal to take
polygraph deemed failure to cooperate); State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735
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bility of polygraph evidence in criminal cases, providing insight into the
Virginia courts' perception of such "scientific evidence." 10 The intent of
this Note is to examine both federal and state cases on polygraph and
urinalysis testing, to analogize urinalysis testing to polygraph testing and
use the resulting synthesis to predict how Virginia courts might assess the
issues surrounding an employee's dismissal for refusing to submit to a
urinalysis.
A. Problems with the Tests
The goals of urinalysis testing are to deter employee drug use,1" to in-
crease employee productivity and to promote job safety. 2 Whether
urinalysis actually achieves these goals is at the heart of the controversy.
Critics of both drug and polygraph testing point to erroneous test
results," the inability of urinalysis tests to measure actual impairment, 4
(Minn. 1981) (employee compelled to take polygraph violates statute); Kamrath v. Subur-
ban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (post-traumatic stress syndrome
resulted from mandated polygraph); Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111
(W. Va. 1984) (dismissal for failure to submit to polygraph violates public policy).
10. Robinson v Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 341 S.E.2d 159 (1986) ("polygraph exami-
nations are so thoroughly unreliable as to be of no proper evidentiary use" Id. at 156, 341
S.E.2d 167); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 59, 348 S.E.2d 36 (1986) ("To conclude
that an unreliable test can yield results which are definite and conclusive is a non sequitur."
Id. at 62, 348 S.E.2d at 38).
11. Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employ-
ees: Toward a General Rule of Legality under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv.
201, 208 (1986).
12. Id. at 210.
13. Much of the criticism is directed toward the defective nature of the tests. The most
commonly used field test kits are the Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique
("EMIT") and the Abuscreen Test. For an explanation of the principles underlying the vari-
ous methods of biochemical urinalysis, see Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinal-
ysis Testing Results for the Purpose of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 Wis. L. REv. 391
(1984). Both the EMIT and the Abuscreen are considered effective screening devices but not
conclusive tests because of the false positive results which may occur. Id. at 394. The manu-
facturers of these tests expressly instruct consumers to submit every positive test to a sec-
ond confirmatory test, despite their alleged 99% accuracy rate. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note
1, at 30.
A consistently recommended method of confirming drug use is the gas chromatography
mass spectrometry ("GCIMS") technique. EMPLOYER DRUG SCREENING, supra note 1, at 7.
GC/MS is a much more costly method because the testing requires a laboratory setting with
technicians trained to operate the expensive, highly sensitive instrument which separates
unidentified compounds. Id. at 6-7. GCIMS has been assessed as 100% accurate in the de-
tection of marijuana use. Moyer, Palmer, Johnson, Charlesen & Ellefson, Marijuana Test-
ing-How Good Is It?, 62 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 413, 417 (1987). Subsequent confirmation test-
ing of positive results may cost as much as $80 per sample. The high cost may explain why
some employers opt not to use GC/MS confirmation. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
Other evaluators report the rate of "false positives" to be as high as 25%. The Many
Tests For Drug Abuse, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 3, at 17, col. 1. False positives occur
when the urinalysis indicates the presence of a targeted drug when it is not actually present.
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the inability of polygraphs to detect deception,15 and the hostile, distrust-
False negative errors, indicating the absence of a particular drug when it is actually present,
have been found to occur more frequently than false positives. Hansen, Caudill & Boone,
Crisis in Drug Testing, 253 J. A.M.A. 2382 (1985).
Compounding the error rate is the fact that tests administered by trained laboratory tech-
nicians have been found to yield a range of zero to sixty-six percent rate of false positives.
McGovern, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on
Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (1987) [hereinafter McGovern]. These tests were con-
ducted under the controlled conditions of a laboratory. Similar blind studies on the error
rates of tests performed in the field by non-technicians are needed.
14. Urinalysis merely detects the presence of a suspect drug. SPECiAL REPORT, supra note
1, at 29. Urine tests cannot detect "how recently the drug was used, how exposure occurred,
or how the drug affected work performance." Herman & Bernholz, Negligence in Employee
Drug Testing, 92 CASE & COM. 3, 4 (July-Aug. 1987).
Nor are urine tests precise. Positive results can result from the passive inhalation of mari-
juana smoke, natural bodily enzymes, aspirin, and from eating poppyseed bagels. Id. A posi-
tive test result for cocaine may appear as a result of drinking herbal tea. SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 29-30. Over-the-counter medication containing phenobarbital may also test
positive. Id. at 30.
Urinalysis is incapable of distinguishing between on-duty and off-duty drug use. McGov-
ern, supra note 13, at 1457. Researchers studying the correlation between smoking mari-
juana and its delayed effects on driving a car and on operating an airplane reached contra-
dictory findings that would not allow reliable predictions about impairment. Barnett, Licko
& Thompson, Behavioral Pharmacokinetics of Marijuana, 85 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 51
(1985).
15. Employers typically use polygraph testing to screen applicants and to investigate
incidents of theft or wrongdoing. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment,
63 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28 (1977). The theory behind polygraph examinations is that changes
in a person's heartbeat, respiration, skin resistance, and blood pressure indicates truth or
deception. Comment, Regulation of Polygraph Testing in the Employment Context: Sug-
gested Statutory Control on Test Use and Examiner Policy, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 113, 116-
17 (1981) [hereinafter Regulation of Polygraph Testing]. However, the same physiological
reactions can be caused by factors other than lying such as "nervousness, state of mind,
moral attitude toward lying, physical handicaps, the location of the test, and even the per-
sonality of the examiner." Hearings, supra note 3, at 4 (statement of Rep. Stewart McKin-
ney, Conn.).
The probability of inaccurate polygraph results increases when the test is used in the pre-
employment context. Broad questions which explore an applicant's past are not likely to be
a valid indicator of the person's present honesty. Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective Em-
ployee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Test-
ing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 85 (1971). The more specific the area of inquiry, the more accurate
the analysis. Administering and interpreting the polygraphs are highly subjective tasks. The
accuracy of the test depends on the skill, training and competence of the technician, which
has frequently been found lacking. Regulation of Polygraph Testing, supra, at 114-15.
The American Polygraph Association ("APA") claims an accuracy rate of 90%. Hearings,
supra note 3, at 29 (statement of Norma Rollins, Assoc. Director, New York Civil Liberties
Union). Based on this percentage, of the 2.3 million people tested in 1985, 230,000 people
were incorrectly labelled as either honest or dishonest. Studies performed by non-APA re-
searchers demonstrate an accuracy rate of between 64 and 73%. Id. at 56. The unreliability
of polygraph examinations has generated strong opposition to their use in employment set-
tings. Id. at 46. Using polygraphs to conduct background checks on applicants was charac-
terized as "twentieth century witchcraft." Id. (statement of Robert F. Harbrant, President,
Food and Allied Service Trades Department, AFL-CIO).
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ful work environment such testing fosters.' Conversely, advocates cite to
drug testing's valuable deterrent effect and point to the United States
Navy's successful drug testing program as an example.' 7
Employers have turned to both urinalysis and polygraph tests, believ-
ing them to be more cost-effective than more traditional methods of labor
management such as thorough background investigations, rigorous train-
ing, close supervision, performance evaluations, and dismissals for docu-
mented just cause. However, the cost of litigation which may flow from
abusing urinalysis and polygraph tests as labor management techniques
should cause employers to re-evaluate their cost effectiveness. For in-
stance, employers may be held liable if presumptively confidential test
results are disclosed to the public, the police, or to prospective employ-
ers.'8 Misuse of the information obtained from the urinalysis may also
trigger liability. Misuse is any use other than to determine drug use.
Urinalysis may reveal "pregnancy, social alcohol use,. . . epilepsy, diabe-
tes, or manic-depression."'19 Discovery of these medical conditions may
result in prejudicial treatment or wrongful discharge of the employee,
whether or not the condition affects his job performance. Firing or re-
jecting an employee solely on the basis of an unconfirmed positive urinal-
ysis test result would also constitute misuse and may give rise to a claim
of negligent testing.2 0 Manufacturers and toxicologists alike stress the
need for confirmatory testing.2 '
Given the unequal bargaining power of employees vis-a-vis employers,
it is arguable that submitting to a urinalysis or a polygraph test is truly
consensual. There is no consent if an employee does not know that a
urine specimen taken during a routine physical is secretly tested for
drugs. Moreover, an employee who refuses a "request" for a urine sample
The Polygraph Protection Act of 1985 passed the House, but died in the Senate Labor
Committee. 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,018 (Dec. 10, 1986).
16. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
17. In 1980, 47% of the seamen in the study under the age of 26 admitted to recent
illicit drug use. Following the implementation of drug testing, the rate fell to 4%. Id.
18. Miller, supra note 10, at 232.
19. Id. Just as employers have gone beyond the scope of legitimate interests in con-
ducting urinalysis testing, so have employers who conduct polygraphs. Questions of a highly
personal nature may be put to employees during an examination. The subject may resist
responding to these questions, but the machine continues to record physiological changes
that accompany the silence or evasion. Regulations of Polygraph Testing, supra note 15, at
118. In an effort to partially remedy this abuse, Virginia statutorily prohibits questions per-
taining to sexual activities from being asked during polygraph examinations "unless such
sexual activity of the prospective employee has resulted in a conviction of a violation of the
criminal laws of this State." VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.4:3 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
20. L. Dogoloff & R. Angarola, Urine Testing in the Workplace 15 (S. Price ed. 1985).
21. Hansen, Drug Abuse Testing Programs Gaining Acceptance in the Workplace, 64
CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS 7, 9 (1986).
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or a polygraph test places himself in a "no-win" situation. 22 While the
employee's refusal of the request arouses the employer's suspicion as to
drug use, submitting to the test may confirm them. An employee's refusal
to submit to testing may place his prospective or current employment at
risk. Thus, "the economic compulsions are generally such that the em-




The United States Constitution extends to public employees limited
protections against intrusions by the federal, state or local government as
an employer. Unfortunately, employees working in the private sector have
few comparable protections from the abuses of their employers. 24 As a
general rule, federal constitutional protections inhibit only government or
state actions, not the actions of private employers.25 However, where the
conduct of a private employer has been such an abusive interference with
the employee's constitutional rights, courts have found a violation of pub-
lic policy and rejected the private employer's state action defense. Gross
violations of an individual's constitutional rights may bring the actions of
private individuals within the purview of the fourteenth amendment.2 6
1. Fourth Amendment Challenges
McDonell v. Hunter27 was a class action suit brought on behalf of
prison guards challenging the constitutionality of Department of Correc-
tions officials' discretionary searches." One of the guards, McDonell, had
been observed associating with certain people suspected of drug involve-
ment. Based on this observation alone, he was requested to submit to a
urinalysis. McDonell refused, and as a result his employment was termi-
nated.29 McDonell alleged that the Department of Corrections' drug test-
22. McGovern, supra note 13, at 1475.
23. Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 115 (W. Va. 1984) (quoting
State v. Community Distributors, Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 484, 317 A.2d 697, 699 (1974)).
24. McGovern, supra note 13, at 1455.
25. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 60. Private employers have successfully defended
constitutional challenges with state action arguments. Id.
26. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state action defense rejected in face of
flagrant abuse of individual's constitutional rights); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d
894 (3d Cir. 1983) (private employer's violation of employee's constitutional rights violated
public policy).
27. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
28. Id. at 1304. Employees were subjected to searches of their vehicles, strip searches,
urinalyses, blood tests and breath tests. Id.
29. Id. at 1304-05. McDonell was reinstated with lost pay ten days later. Id.
[Vol. 23:75
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ing policy violated his fourth amendment rights and constitutional right
to privacy.30
The court began its analysis by recognizing previous federal decisions
which held that urinalysis constituted a search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment." The court balanced the state's need
to search prison employees as a means of insuring prison security and the
invasion of the employee's right to privacy.32 The court reasoned that,
while on duty, corrections officers have a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy, and that such a diminished expectation of privacy is reasonable.3
Within these parameters, the court addressed both the uniform, random
drug testing scheme3 4 and the conducting of drug tests based on a reason-
able suspicion. The court held that urinalysis could be "performed uni-
formly or by systematic random selection" upon employees who had daily
contact with prisoners, so long as the selection was not arbitrary or capri-
cious. 3 5 The court based its decision on the importance of insuring prison
safety and security, the fact that urinalysis is not as intrusive as body
searches, and corrections employees' diminished expectation of privacy
under the fourth amendment.3 6
The court analyzed the facts of McDonell according to the rationale
espoused in Shoemaker v. Handel.3 7  Shoemaker8  upheld daily
breathalyzer testing and random, unscheduled drug testing of race horse
jockeys. The court in Shoemaker determined that race horse jockeys had
a diminished expectation of privacy because they were employed in a
30. Id. at 1305. The court did not decide the privacy issue. See McGovern, supra note
13, at 1465.
31. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1307 (citing Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1513 (D.N.J. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd in
part, vacated in part, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
In re Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, -, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322,
1325-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
This line of cases developed from the ruling in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1966), where the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment right of people to be
secure in their persons from unreasonable search and seizure extended to the involuntary
taking of blood for testing. In Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513, the court analogized urine and
blood samples, noting that both are obtained for the purpose of learning physiological facts
about the person through chemical analysis. Therefore, the search and seizure protections
afforded blood tests also applied to urine tests. Id.
32. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1307.
33. Id. at 1306.
34. A uniform, random drug testing scheme is one where every worker in every class is
eligible for testing, but persons to be tested are selected on a random basis from the class.
35. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308.
36. Id.
37. Id. (construing Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
577 (1986).
38. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136.
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heavily regulated industry.3 9 The court weighed the jockeys' diminished
expectations of privacy against the state's desire to ensure the integrity of
the horse racing industry. The heavily "'regulated industry' exception to
the warrant requirement"4 of the fourth amendment applied to the horse
racing industry because jockeys must be licensed. The licensing require-
ment was also used to support the court's conclusion that the jockeys'
expectations of privacy were diminished.4 ' The balance was struck be-
tween the jockeys' "somewhat" diminished expectation of privacy and the
public's confidence in the integrity of the horse racing industry.4 2 The
interests of the "betting" public were found to outweigh the jockeys' di-
minished expectations of privacy. 3 Thus, the court appears to hold that
the interests of a particular group of society are sufficient to meet the
definition of a compelling "state" interest under the fourth amendment.
Prior to Shoemaker, the only cases that had upheld random urinalysis
testing under the fourth amendment involved military personnel. Those
decisions were based on the rationale that national security required ser-
vicemen to be fit for duty twenty-four hours a day.4 4 Prior to Shoemaker,
only public safety and concern about safety-sensitive jobs such as law en-
forcement, which impact on the entire public, were compelling enough to
permit warrantless urinalysis.4 5 Prior to Shoemaker, several cases had
characterized urinalysis as equally as degrading as body cavity searches."'
However, the Shoemaker court disagreed and stated that urinalysis is less
intrusive than body cavity and strip searches.47 The public's interest in
drug-free jockeys is not a public safety issue and not an interest "compel-
ling enough to warrant the severe intrusion urinalysis testing repre-
39. Id. at 1142.
40. Miller, supra note 11, at 228. Types of warrant requirement exceptions include con-
sent searches, criminal searches where obtaining a warrant is impractical, and the limited
routine searches that promote "particular regulatory schemes," as found in the firearm or
liquor industries which are closely regulated by government. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 358-59 (1974).
41. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1141.
42. Id. at 1142.
43. Id.
44. Miller, supra note 11 at 231. The first major use of urinalysis was in 1972 by the
military. Because the testing was pursuant to the government's capacity as employer, as
opposed to law enforcer, an administrative exception was taken to the fourth amendment
allowing the government to legally test entire units without individualized suspicion, proba-
ble cause or warrants. The courts found that the government's need for military readiness
sufficiently "outweighed the servicemembers' fourth amendment rights," thus establishing a
balancing test approach. McGovern, supra note 13, at 1460-61; see Murray v. Haldeman, 16
M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983) (random urinalysis upheld due to need for military preparedness).
45. Miller, supra note 11, at 230; see Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005
(D.C. 1985).
46. See Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600
F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
47. Miller, supra note 11, at 230.
[Vol. 23:75
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sents.' 4 s Thus, Shoemaker sets a low threshold for a state's interest to be
compelling.
It appears to be unnecessary that the McDonell court followed the
anomalous 9 findings of Shoemaker regarding random urinalysis because
there were no facts establishing that the corrections institution needed
random drug testing. There was no factual basis for the McDonel major-
ity to conclude that employees who use drugs and have daily contact with
prisoners are likely to supply drugs to inmates.50 Moreover, this rationale
is not congruent with the court's ruling that other urinalysis requests
must be based on reasonable suspicion,5' a standard which calls for a fac-
tual basis. The court in McDonell clearly states that such reasonable sus-
picion is "based on specific objective facts and reasonable inferences
drawn from these facts in light of experience that the employee is then
under the influence of drugs . . . or that the employee has used a con-
trolled substance within the twenty-four hour period prior to the required
test. ' 52 This language implies that urinalysis should be used as a tool to
corroborate reasonable suspicions of on-the-job impairment. Also, this
language implies that an employer's legitimate interests and reasonable
suspicions regarding employee conduct should be limited to that which
directly relates to job performance.5 3 If the McDonell court had applied
its own test of reasonableness it would have reached a different conclu-
sion on the random urinalysis issue because there was no evidence to sup-
port the need for random tests.
Apparently responding to criticism lodged against urinalysis testing,
the court in dicta stressed the need for strict guidelines to assure confi-
dentiality of urine test results. 4 The court stated that measures should
be taken to ensure that equipment and procedures were sufficiently trust-
worthy to ensure accuracy.5 5 The court also rejected the state's argument
that by signing a consent form, correctional employees had waived their
expectation of privacy. Consent to a search "must be given voluntarily
and without coercion determined from the totality of the circum-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 230-31.
50. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308.
51. Miller, supra note 11, at 231.
52. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308.
53. Miller, supra note 11, at 224.
54. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1309.
55. Id. The court specified that drug testing equipment and procedures should conform
to standards set out in Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986). In Spence, prisoners
alleged that the Iowa State Penitentiary's random drug testing policy violated their consti-
tutional rights because the drug tests used were not reliable. Id. at 754-55. The court held
that double EMIT testing satisfied due process requirements and provided adequate protec-
tion of the inmates' fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 756. Inmates, however, were not
allowed to present expert testimony regarding EMIT reliability. EMIT's 95% accuracy rate
was deemed sufficient for disciplinary action. Id.
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
stances." ' Thus, employers cannot alwayg rely upon consent forms to
protect themselves from fourth amendment challenges.
Despite the arguments that Shoemaker was not a well-reasoned case,57
two recent suits have been based on its theory. In one case, random drug
screening was upheld, and in the other case, it was rejected.58 As noted in
Rushton, the Shoemaker court established that a "warrantless adminis-
trative search is justified where a strong state interest exists in con-
ducting an unannounced search and the pervasive regulation of the in-
dustry has reduced the justifiable privacy expectation of the individual
searched."59 This reasoning was applied in Rushton v. Nebraska Public
Power District.6 0 The Nebraska Public Power District's nuclear power
station was heavily regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC")6 ' which required that the area be protected and secure. The few
officials who were authorized to have unescorted access were subjected to
detector devices and pat-downs.2 These facts led the court to conclude
that the employees of a nuclear power plant have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy6" due to the vital need for safety associated with employ-
ment in the nuclear power industry. Therefore, the administrative search
exception64 to the fourth amendment was applicable 5 and properly ap-
plied to the facts. The conclusion reached in Rushton is much more credi-
ble than in Shoemaker, given the truly compelling interest of protecting
the public from nuclear accidents, and the employees' diminished expec-
tation of privacy being one that the public as a whole would deem to be
reasonable.
56. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1310.
57. Miller, supra note 11, at 228. Miller strongly criticizes Shoemaker as "unsupportable
in light of both current search and seizure case law, and more particularly the rule of legal-
ity currently prevailing in urinalysis testing cases." Id.
58. See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987) (ran-
dom urinalysis of nuclear plant employees upheld). Cf. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (1987) (random urinalysis of police officers re-
jected since law enforcement is not a highly-regulated industry).
59. Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1524.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1512-13.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1524-25. The NRC required the Nebraska Public Power District, as a licensee,
to search employees entering the nuclear power station for firearms, explosives, and incendi-
ary devices. Packages and vehicles were searched and employees were subject to random
pat-down searches. Id.
64. Warrantless searches of businesses in highly regulated industries do not violate the
fourth amendment because of the strong public interest involved. Also businesses who enter
highly regulated industries have impliedly consented to warrantless searches in that they
expect regulation to be enforced via inspections. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor industry); United States v. Biswell, 406, U.S. 311 (1972)
(guns).
65. Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1525.
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In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark,66 narcotic bureau of-
ficers were ordered to provide urine samples. The officers sued claiming a
violation of their fourth amendment rights. The court quickly determined
that the taking of urine samples constituted a search and seizure within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. The issue then became whether
the search was reasonable. The court's discussion indicated that to be
reasonable, a warrantless search must be based on some well- grounded,
individualized suspicion. 7
Starting with the premise that warrantless searches, absent probable
cause are unconstitutional, 6 the court looked for exceptions to the war-
rant requirement. The City of Newark relied on Shoemaker, and argued
that urinalysis of law enforcement officers comes within the "pervasively
regulated industry"6 9 exception to the warrant requirement. This excep-
tion permits searches and seizures without either probable cause or an
individualized suspicion. The pervasively regulated industry exception to
the warrant requirement applies when unannounced administrative
searches of private commercial property are necessary to insure that regu-
lations are being followed.70 While on commercial property, employees of
highly regulated industries are also subject to warrantless searches.71 The
City of Newark contended that because its police officers were bound by
statutes and administrative regulations, they were subject to warrantless
administrative searches.
The court rejected the Shoemaker-premised argument as "inapplica-
ble,"7 2 stating that "[plolice officers are not members of a 'highly-regu-
lated' industry; '73 that law enforcement is not a "commercial enter-
prise;' '74 and to find otherwise would "dangerously extend and distort
[the highly-regulated industry] exception to the warrant requirement be-
yond its intended scope." 75 As no special exception to the warrant re-
quirement existed, the burden fell upon the city to demonstrate the rea-
sonableness of the proposed urinalysis program 6 which it could not do.7 7
66. 216 N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (1987).
67. Id. at _. 524 A.2d at 432-33.
68. Id. at -, 524 A.2d at 433.
69. Id. at -' 524 A.2d at 434.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at -, 524 A.2d at 435.
73. Id. at -, 524 A.2d at 434.
74. Id. at -, 524 A.2d at 435.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at., 524 A.2d at 437. The court listed the considerations involved in balancing
the need for the search against the invasion of personal rights as: (1) the scope of the intru-
sion; (2) the manner in which the search is conducted; (3) the justification for the search; (4)
the place in which the search is conducted; (5) the need for the particular technique; and (6)
whether practical, alternative means are available. The private interests considered in the
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The majority of decided cases addressing urinalysis in the public em-
ployment sector "have concluded that such testing is unconstitutional in
the absence of some reasonable individualized suspicion." s The reasoning
of these cases recognizes the public employer's interest in public safety 9
as balanced against the public employee's diminished expectation of pri-
vacy.80 The courts look for a "factual showing that drug use is widespread
among the specific employees in question or that it presents an identifi-
able risk to the public." ' The reasonable individualized suspicion test
protects employee privacy while enabling the public employer to prevent
the use of drugs in the workplace.8 2 Applying the above analysis, the
court concluded that the random urinalysis proposed by the City of New-
ark for its narcotic bureau officers was unreasonable and constitutionally
invalid since the city had neither probable cause nor individualized
suspicion."
2. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
Fourteenth amendment challenges may be grounded upon violations of
substantive due process8 4 and procedural due process.8 5 For example, in
Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District"' employees of a nuclear
power plant raised both substantive and procedural due process claims.
The employees alleged that the risk of false positive results from the
urinalysis tests arbitrarily subjected them to the risk of losing their jobs.
This substantive due process claim was denied by the court because evi-
dence showed that the test was accurate when used in conjunction with a
balancing test included: (1) the degree of personal intrusion; (2) whether the search is for
civil or regulatory purposes or to discover evidence of a crime; (3) whether the intrusion is a
search or an inquiry; (4) whether the intrusion is of the person, residence, automobile or
commercial premises; and (5) whether the intrusion is based on individualized suspicion. Id.
at -, 524 A.2d at 435-36.




82. Id. Contra National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, (5th Cir.
1987) (random urinalysis of Customs Service employees); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d
1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (random urinalysis of prison guards); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power
Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987) (random urinalysis of nuclear plant employees).
83. Factors which support reasonable suspicion include "absenteeism, deterioration of
work habits, chronic lateness, and confidential information as to illegal drug use." Newark,
216 N.J. Super. at -, 524 A.2d at 438.
84. "Substantive due process provides a shield against arbitrary and capricious depriva-
tions of liberty." Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1525 (D. Neb.
1987).
85. Procedural due process provides for notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at
1527.
86. 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987).
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confirmatory method. 2 The Rushton court also found the employees'
procedural due process claim lacking because the employees had the op-
portunity to be heard both prior to the imposition of the drug testing and
prior to the termination proceedings for their failure to submit to urinal-
ysis testing.8
Everett v. Napper89 addressed a city firefighter's claim90 that his four-
teenth amendment rights were violated when he was suspended without a
hearing for refusing to submit to a urinalysis test. The firefighter was
asked to submit to a urinalysis following a report that the firefighter had
purchased marijuana from an informant. The firefighter's refusal resulted
in immediate suspension based on the violation of the department rule
that employees "shall promptly obey all proper and lawful orders of
supervisors."'"
The firefighter claimed that his suspension without a hearing violated
his procedural due process rights. In analyzing the notice and opportunity
to be heard elements of due process, the Everett court looked to Cleve-
land Board of Education v. Loudermill2 In Loudermill, the Supreme
Court held that the minimum due process rights to which an employee in
the public sector is entitled prior to termination are oral or written no-
tice, an explanation of the charges against the employee, and an opportu-
nity to respond to the charges. 3 To require more would unduly frustrate
public employers confronted with unsatisfactory employees.94 Based on
Loudermill, the Everett court determined that prior to termination a
public sector employee need only receive notice of the charges against
him and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property
interest. 5 The plaintiff firefighter had participated in a full hearing which
87. Id. at 1525.
88. Id. at 1527.
89. 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 833 F.2d 1507 (11th
Cir. 1987).
90. The firefighter also claimed a violation of the fourth amendment. However, the court
held that no search had occurred within the meaning of the fourth amendment because the
firefighter had refused to submit to the urinalysis. Id. at 1484.
91. Id. at 1483.
92. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
93. Id. at 546.
94. Id.
95. Everett, 632 F. Supp. at 1485. There was written notice t6 the employees that they
would be subject to polygraphs and drug tests. The notice, however, was in the form of a
memorandum which was issued the day before the firefighter was asked to submit to the
urinalysis. The department had previously promulgated rules prohibiting the use of drugs
while on duty, and prohibiting off-duty use that impaired performance. The previous rules,
however, had no requirement that polygraph or drug test refusals could result in termina-
tion of employment. The court gave very little regard to the short notice of the policy. Id. at
1483-84.
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was held within two months of the suspension. This period of time was
considered reasonable and not a violation of procedural due process."
The firefighter also contended that the department's urinalysis require-
ment violated his substantive due process rights and that his termination
based on his refusal to submit to a urinalysis test was arbitrary and capri-
cious. The test for determining the constitutional validity of government
intrusion is predicated upon the particular interest involved and whether
there is a reasonable need for the intrusion. 97 The issue before the court,
therefore, was to evaluate whether the Bureau's need to test employees
implicated by the informant was reasonable, and whether the testing was
rationally connected to protecting public welfare and property." The
court found that drug use by firefighters would pose a serious threat to
community safety. Consequently, the Bureau's interest in insuring that
firefighters were fit to protect the safety of the community was. "suffi-
ciently rational justification" for the urinalysis requirement.9 The court
therefore granted summary judgment to the Bureau on the substantive
due process claim. 00
3. Fifth Amendment Challenges
In Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District,10 employees argued
that a drug testing program administered by the Nebraska Public Power
District violated their fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination.
The protection of the fifth amendment, however, extends only to self-
incriminating evidence that is testimonial or communicative.0 2 The re-
sults of blood tests were not viewed as evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature in Schmerber v. California10 3 Therefore, the Rushton
court similarly concluded that the results of urine tests are "not evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature"10' 4 and therefore do not compel
an employee to be a witness against himself. Accordingly, urinalysis evi-
96. Id. at 1485. On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's ruling on the plaintiff's procedural due process claim. The court held that the
Bureau was required to offer the plaintiff a hearing before suspending him without pay.
Everett, 833 F.2d at 1512.
97. Everett, 632 F. Supp. at 1485.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1486.
101. 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987).
102. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking blood sample to determine
intoxication was an attempt to gather incriminating evidence, however, the blood test re-
sults constitute neither testimony nor a communicative act).
103. Id.
104. Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1528. Persons challenging polygraph examinations could
arguably allege violation of their fifth amendment rights. Responses made to questions




dence was not viewed as self-incriminating and thus the admission of the
urinalysis results did not violate the fifth amendment.
4. Ninth Amendment Challenges
The right to privacy is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution
but it has been retained by the people through the ninth amendment. 15
The right to privacy protects the intimacy of the mind, the body and the
home.10 6 Interference with this fundamental liberty should only be per-
mitted in the face of a "compelling state interest.' 01 7 In Rushton v. Ne-
braska Public Power District0 8 employees claimed privacy rights in the
act of urination and in the medical information contained within the
urine samples themselves. However the court found that in order for the
plaintiffs to have sustained a right of privacy claim in the act of urina-
tion, at a minimum, the act would have had to have been witnessed. 09
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit established a privacy right
to the information gleaned from a urinalysis in Shoemaker v. Handel.10
However, the Rushton court reasoned that if the employer's interest in
obtaining the urinalysis was sufficiently compelling, then the employer's
right to the information was established."' The Rushton court noted,
however, that disclosure of the information obtained from the urinalysis
to a law enforcement agency would be a violation of the right to privacy,
if such a release by the employer had occurred in the past or would occur
in the future."
2
105. The ninth amendment reserves to the people those rights not enumerated in the
Constitution. The constitutional right to privacy which protects individuals from unlawful
governmental invasion has been found to exist in the penumbra of the ninth amendment.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right to privacy has been extended to
protect individuals from unwarranted disclosure of personal information to governmental
agencies. Gunn v. Employment Development Dept., 94 Cal. App.3d 658, 156 Cal. Rptr. 584
(1979). See generally Watson, The Ninth Amendment: Source of a Substantive Right to
Privacy, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 959 (1986); Note, Guarantying the Right to Privacy: A
Proposal, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 615 (1986); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE
L.J. 421 (1980).
106. J. BAKALAR & L. GaNSPooN, DRUG CONTROL IN A FREE SocIETY, 117 (1984). Ten
state constitutions have recognized a right to privacy: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington. See SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 76 (citing Luck v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., No. C-84-3-230 (Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Aug. 5, 1985).
107. J. BAKALAR & L. GRINSPOON, supra note 106, at 117.
108. 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1529 (D. Neb. 1987).
109. Id. at 1528.
110. 795 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
111. Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1528.
112. Id.
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C. Private Employees
Private employers are not constrained by the protections of the United
States Constitution because of the state action barrier. 1 3 Employees in
the private sector must look to state1 4 or federal legislation' for reme-
dies against a discharge for failure to submit to a urinalysis. Private sec-
tor employees have also grounded their claims in tort or contract law."'
1. Tort of Invasion of Privacy
It has been said that "the right to privacy is an individual right that
should be held inviolate. To hold otherwise, under modern means of com-
munication, hearing devices, photography, and other technological ad-
113. Most constitutional rights protect individuals from the actions of government on
their agents. Individuals receive no constitutional protection from purely private acts. An
employee cannot successfully challenge the acts of a private employer as violating his consti-
tutional rights unless he can show the acts constituted state action. To establish state action
"a complaining party must show that there was a sufficiently close nexus between the state
and the challenged action so that the action of the private party may be treated as that o
the state itself." Stevens v. Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabic Concortium, 576 F. Supp. 516,
522 (D. Md. 1983) (state action defense used successfully where employees jailed for mari-
juana use).
114. No state has yet adopted drug-testing legislation, but twenty-four states have con-
sidered various proposals. The proposals ranged from strictly barring any test that could not
indicate on-the-job impairment, to limiting the tests to those grounded on reasonable suspi-
cion of on-the-job use where the job is safety-sensitive, to tests requiring reasonable suspi-
cion only, and to the least restrictive proposal of merely providing procedural protection.
McGovern, supra note 13, at 1470-71.
Massachusetts attempted to attach a rider to its polygraph regulations that would have
barred the testing of body fluids as a condition of employment. However, the labor unions
refused to support the drug-testing rider because of their concerns about safety which out-
weighed the employees' privacy rights. Id. at 1481.
115. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) is designed to prevent discrimi-
nation against the handicapped. In the area of drug testing, the Act would prohibit the use
of drug testing when used to discriminate against drug addicts. McGovern, supra note 13, at
1469.
Drug testing used in a discriminatory manner against minorities could also be challenged
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. Black employees in Shield Club v. City
of Cleveland, 647 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ohio 1986), rev'd, No. 86-4108 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 1987)
alleged that field urine tests discriminated against blacks because the tests had a 56% false
positive rate for detection of marijuana. Allegedly, the test was reporting traces of marijuana
which were in fact traces of melanin, a dark brown or black skin pigment, whose chemical
analysis resembles marijuana. Researchers have conducted studies that found no cross reac-
tivity between melanin and the marijuana metabolite that shows up in urine and as a result,
they have concluded that there is no basis for the melanin issue. Hansen, supra note 21, at
11.
116. Note, Employee Drug-Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector Employers, 65 N.C.L.
REV. 832, 833 (1987).
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vancements, would effectively deny valuable rights and freedoms to the
individual. 11 7 An invasion of privacy claim requires that a plaintiff show:
(1) the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of his personality; or
(2) the publicizing of his private affairs with which the public has no
legitimate concern; or
(3) the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such a man-
ner as to cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordi-
nary sensibilities." 8
In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.," 9 a private sector em-
ployee challenged the termination of his employment on the grounds of
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
employee, Satterfield, was terminated as a result of a urinalysis per-
formed during his annual physical which tested positive for marijuana.
Satterfield alleged that Lockheed knew or should have known that his
urine sample was not labeled properly and had been confused with other
samples. However, the court dismissed Satterfield's claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress because he failed to show an intrusion so
outrageous as to result in serious mental or physical injury, or humiliation
to himself. 20
In addition, the court dismissed Satterfield's invasion of privacy claim
because Lockheed did not publicize the results of the test. In the urinal-
ysis context, claims of invasion of privacy are grounded in the circum-
stances surrounding the taking of the sample or upon the analysis, use,
and confidentiality of the test results. 2 ' The Satterfield court was not
sympathetic to the private employee's injuries, and would not consider a
claim for invasion of privacy unless the employee actually submitted to
the urinalysis. However, in the future, courts may recognize that a private
employee's rights when forced to submit to a urinalysis are as important
as when the employee is confronted with other types of searches and
seizures, so that the private employee may refuse the test without having
employment terminated.
117. Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 116 (W. Va. 1984) (quoting
Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 876, 105 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1958)).
118. Miller, supra note 11, at 241 (quoting Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
617 F. Supp. 1359, 1369 (D.S.C. 1985)).
119. 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985).
120. Id. at 1369. But cf. O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of Am. Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986)
(polygraph used to investigate drug use was considered to be "highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person and ... invasive of the plaintiff's privacy"). Id. at 1071.
121. McGovern, supra note 13, at 1469. The Code of Ethical Conduct for Physicians
Providing Occupational Medical Services adopts the position that employers are entitled to
information about medical fitness for duty but not to medical diagnosis of their employees.
NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. 86-1477,
DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE 10 (1986).
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2. Wrongful Discharge
At-will employees appear to have the least protection from employers
who use urinalysis and polygraphs. The doctrine of employment at-will
provides that "when a contract of employment does not fix a definite
term the employment is terminable without cause at the will of either
party." '12 2 An employer's right to terminate at-will however, is not abso-
lute."2 ' If the employer's reason for discharge constituted a violation of
public policy,'24 the employee may recover damages under a claim of
wrongful discharge.
In Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., s5 Smith, a private sector
employee, was discharged for refusing to submit to a polygraph following
the discovery of "three suspicious cigarette butts" in his car which was
parked on American Cast Iron Pipe Co.'s ("ACIPCO") premises.126 Part
of ACIPCQ's policy was a verification rule that provided for the dismissal
of any employee who failed to cooperate with the investigation commit-
tee, which included refusal to take a polygraph test when required.'27
Smith was discharged, not for suspected possession of drugs, but for fail-
ure to cooperate with the investigation committee. Smith sued ACIPCO
for breach of contract, arguing that the use of the polygraph in private
employment settings should be void as against public policy. Smith also
claimed that he should have the same constitutional protections from the
use of polygraphs as those accused in a criminal case.'2 8 The court re-
jected Smith's claims and ruled that his discharge was proper. The court
found that protections in private employment situations are contractual,
122. Note, supra note 116, at 842.
123. Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 539, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985)
(termination of at-will employee violated public policy where bank attempted to control
shareholder employee's vote of stock).
124. '[P]ublic policy' is that principle of law which holds that 'no person can lawfully do
that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public good[']
.... It is a question of law which the court must decide in light of the particular
circumstances of each case.
The sources determinative of public policy are, among others, our federal and state
constitutions, our public statutes, our judicial decisions, the applicable principles of
the common law, the acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state gov-
ernments relating to and affecting the safety, health, morals and general welfare of
the people for whom government-with us-is factually established.
Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (W. Va. 1984) (quoting Allen v.
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 131 N.J.L. 475, 477-78, 37 A.2d 37, 38-39 (1944)).
125. 370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979).
126. Id. at 284.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 287. See supra note 10. In a subsequent trial of a different ACIPCO employee
who brought action for wrongful discharge, the court held polygraph tests were admissible.
The employee had voluntarily submitted to the polygraph pursuant to an investigation into
drug trafficking. Green v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 446 So. 2d 16 (Ala. 1984).
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not constitutional, and because ACIPCO's employment handbook pro-
vided for discharge based on a failure to cooperate, Smith's discharge was
proper.
Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.129 also dealt with the wrongful
discharge of an employee who refused to take a polygraph. The Cordle
court reached the opposite conclusion of Smith and upheld the wrongful
discharge claim of two cleaning maids who refused to take a polygraph.
The court found a violation of public policy existed because West Vir-
ginia recognizes a legally protected interest in privacy and has a state law
that limits employers' use of polygraphs."30
In comparing Smith with Cordle, it appears that wrongful discharge
claims of at-will employees will probably not succeed unless that particu-
lar state recognizes a legally protected privacy interest or has legislation
that regulates the use of urinalysis or polygraphs.' 3 ' If a state regulation
prohibits the use of polygraphs, an employee may argue that the use of
urine testing should also be prohibited based on a violation of public pol-
icy. Hence, absent a state constitutional right to privacy, an employee
may establish that an employer's "behavior failed to conform to estab-
lished interests of society"' 3' and thus violated public policy. Therefore, a
private employee's termination for refusing to submit to a urinalysis
would constitute a wrongful discharge.
3. Breach of Contract
Contractual employees who are dismissed on drug-related charges can
challenge the discharge on the grounds of breach of contract and demand
a showing of just cause for their termination. If provided for in the em-
ployment contract, the dispute will be submitted to arbitration. 3 Drug-
related discharges may be set aside in arbitration,1" however, arbitrators
have been persuaded to uphold discharges based on evidence that the em-
ployees received notice of the drug policies, the employees were treated
129. 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984).
130. Id. at 112-13. Accord State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1981)
(violation of Minnesota statute that prohibits employers from compelling employees to take
polygraph); Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (court
upheld a bank teller's award of $60,000 for posttraumatic stress syndrome which resulted
from submitting to polygraph requested by the bank in violation of Minnesota statute).
131. The dissent by Justice Miller in Cordle noted that the majority cited no cases
where a court "permitted an at-will employee to recover on a polygraph discharge in the
absence of a statute forbidding such discharge." Cordle, 325 S.E.2d at 118 (Miller, J.,
dissenting).
132. McGovern, supra note 13, at 1467.
133. Note, supra note 116, at 844.
134. Id.
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equally, the rule was reasonable and there was actual on-the-job
impairment.'35
III. VIRGINIA APPLICATION
In Blake v. Hercules, Inc.,'36 the Virginia Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of whether positive drug test results constituted disqualification
for unemployment benefits. 13 The court held that positive drug test re-
sults were insufficient evidence to establish that the employee, Blake,
willfully disregarded the company's rule prohibiting employees from re-
porting to work under the influence of alcohol.'38
Blake had worked as a solvent powder mixer for about a year and a
half at Hercules, a munitions factory which manufactured explosives. 3 '
The worker safety program at Hercules was stringent and included rules
prohibiting the use or possession of alcohol or drugs on company premises
and further prohibited workers from being under the influence of alcohol
or drugs while at work. 40 Workers were aware of these policies through
worker orientation, newsletters and posted notices. 4 '
The facts of Blake present the situation of an employee in a safety-
sensitive job. The employer's legitimate concern for safety is reflected in
company rules and the care they have taken to make sure employees are
aware of these rules. Blake was not suspected of drug use until the com-
pany received an anonymous tip. Acting upon the tip, a company investi-
gation was conducted which lasted two months and included searches of
Blake's person and car, but failed to produce any evidence. " 2 Prior to the
anonymous tip, no one had observed Blake's alleged drug use or had any
suspicion of on-the-job possession, use or impairment. In addition, the
company reported no unusual absences, diminished productivity or un-
usual behavior by Blake upon which to base their suspicions of drug use.
The caution with which the court reviewed the Blake evidence suggests
that the court would be reluctant to deprive an individual of his constitu-
tional rights without convincing evidence. The court's sympathies appear
to lie with the employee as the burden to prove work-related misconduct
was placed on the employer." The court implied that the employer
lacked reasonable individualized suspicion to warrant a demand for a
urinalysis. Furthermore, the court recognized the lack of scientific evi-
135. Id.
136. 4 Va. App. 270, 356 S.E.2d 453 (1987).
137. Id. at 271 n.1, 356 S.E.2d at 454 n.1.
138. Id. at 271, 356 S.E.2d at 454.




143. Id. at 273, 356 S.E.2d at 455.
URINALYSIS
dence correlating the presence of a drug in one's urine with on-the-job
impairment and the imprecision of urinalysis testing because it does not
distinguish between on and off-duty use or active or passive drug
exposure. '44
The tone of the Blake decision suggests that if the case involved a pub-
lic employee discharged for failure to submit to a urinalysis, Virginia
courts would adopt a reasonable individualized suspicion test that would
require some objective factual basis before an employer's demand for a
urinalysis would be constitutionally valid. This test would require ob-
served, documented behavior that suggested intoxication, poor perform-
ance or unlawful conduct on the part of the employee. With such evi-
dence at hand, an employer could then legitimately use a urinalysis test
as a tool to corroborate the existing suspicions. This conclusion appar-
ently would be reached even in the face of the ultrahazardous work site of
a munitions factory. The dicta in Blake implies that the employer's need
for drug testing would have to be based on some objective factual basis
and an overriding, compelling interest in order to justify intrusion.
For the past thirty years, Virginia has rejected the admissibility of pol-
ygraph test results due to their lack of reliability. 4 5 This fact further sup-
ports the contention that employer use of urinalysis testing would not be
given blanket approval. In Taylor v. Commonwealth,'46 the Virginia
Court of Appeals stated that the burden of establishing the trustworthi-
ness of scientific evidence rests upon the proffering party.4 7 Virginia
courts that extend this burden of proof to the admissibility of urinalysis
test results will be putting both public and private employers on notice to
develop strict procedural guidelines that incorporate confirmatory meth-
ods in drug testing programs.
Virginia's adherence to the doctrine of employment at-will suggests
that a private employee's wrongful discharge claim would have to be pre-
mised on a violation of public policy. A claim that employer-mandated
polygraph or urinalysis tests violate public policy would most likely fail in
Virginia because there are no statutes forbidding or restricting their use
nor are there any cases that find their use to be an egregious intrusion
upon an employee's right of privacy. The possibility of adding a right to
privacy provision to section 10 of the revised Virginia Constitution was
rejected because the revisers believed a thorough study of the implica-
tions of new technologies should be conducted prior to such an addi-
tion." "' Thus, it appears that tort cases initiated by private employees for
invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge would not likely succeed.
144. Id.
145. See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 156, 341 S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986).
146. 3 Va. App. 59, 348 S.E.2d 36 (1986).
147. Id. at 62, 348 S.E.2d at 37.
148. A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, 175 n.9 (1974).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Whether an employee is in the public or private sector, he or she
should not be subjected to a urinalysis test as a condition of employment
unless the employer has a reasonable, objective, individualized suspicion
or the employee's job is safety-sensitive. It is not necessary to violate per-
sonal liberties to combat drug use on the job. Methods less intrusive than
urinalysis such as close supervision, performance evaluations and dismis-
sals for just cause should be utilized whenever feasible to achieve the
goals of job safety, increased productivity and reduced costs. Every possi-
ble safeguard should be explored to insure that the employee's personal
freedom and right to privacy are not lost in a specimen jar.
Gloria L. Freye
